Antitrust Writing Awards
Antitrust Writing Awards
Two articles by CRA consultants and academic affiliates were recognized with 2015 Antitrust Writing Awards. The awards aim to promote antitrust scholarship and competition advocacy by recognizing and awarding the best articles published in antitrust law and the law and economics fields over the last 12 months. The winners were announced during a ceremony hosted by the Concurrences Journal and George Washington University Law School Competition Law Center on April 14, 2015 in Washington, DC. In addition, two CRA articles were shortlisted for awards. To read the articles, click on the links below.
Best Intellectual Property Article
In recent years, there has been a dramatic upsurge of “strategic patent acquisitions.” The authors define this as the acquisition of a portfolio of patents reading on a specified area such as flash memory, biosensors, database management, or wireless digital messaging, which may be asserted against “target products” in that area. In this article, they examine the economic effects of strategic patent acquisitions and discuss their antitrust implications.
Best Economics Article
The Discount Attribution Test and the Competitive Effects of Loyalty Discounts
Monopoly Matters, Vol. 12, No. 1, Fall 2014
This article shows that the discount attribution test framework provides a simple, intuitive way to illustrate the procompetitive consequences of loyalty discounts. In particular, the discount attribution test framework can be used to illustrate the effect, on both rivals and on buyers, of allowing sellers to offer loyalty discounts. In so doing, this framework sheds light on the misconceptions about loyalty discounts.
The Intel case has been considered a “test case” for the Commission’s effects-based approach toward single-firm conduct, which it had set out in its 2009 Guidance Paper. The prior case law had largely been form-based and operated with strong legal presumptions, leaving little room for an analysis of the competitive nature of potentially exclusionary conduct.
Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of institutional investors. Using the airline industry as a laboratory, the authors provide evidence that such common ownership has adverse effects on product market competition. The paper first documents that taking common ownership into account implies increases in market concentration that are 10 times larger than what is “presumed to be likely to enhance market power” by antitrust authorities. It then identifies a positive effect of common ownership on airline ticket prices by exploiting differences across routes in the evolution of common ownership over time. To address reverse causality and other endogeneity concerns, results are confirmed using the exogenous shock to airline ownership concentration generated by BlackRock’s acquisition of Barclays Global Investors in 2009.