Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure - Best Theoretical Paper Award 2018 by IJIO

Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure - Best Theoretical Paper Award 2018 by IJIO

Serge Moresi
Antitrust & Competition

Serge Moresi and Marius Schwartz were awarded the Best Theoretical Paper Award 2018 by the International Journal of Industrial Organization for their paper “Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure.” The authors motivate the paper with the fact that vertically integrated firms often supply inputs to other firms with whom they compete in a downstream market. To cite just one example, Samsung supplies components for iPhones and produces competing devices. The paper develops a theoretical model of an input monopolist that both sells output in the downstream market and supplies inputs to a differentiated downstream rival. The authors show that a firm selling inputs to a rival often gains if the rival expands.  

The International Journal of Industrial Organization Best Paper Award 2018 (formerly the Paul Geroski Best Paper Award) is awarded to the two best papers published in the journal from the previous year. Papers are selected by the editorial board of the journal.

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